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In this paper we study the monetary and fiscal policy making in a monetary union when authorities 
face asymmetries in the countries constructing this monetary union. We analyze this problem in an 
asymmetric environment using a two-country theoretical model and by introducing two alternative 
types of national asymmetries : asymmetric shocks and the asymmetric transmission mechanism. The 
central issue of the paper is the design of the appropriate monetary and fiscal policy institutions. In this 
respect, we investigate which of the two alternative types of monetary policymakers (country 
representatives or governors) facing to two alternative types of fiscal policy (decentralized or 
centralized) contributes to better resolve the problem of the trade-off between credibility and 
flexibility. Our results show that delegate the monetary policy to a council of union-wide governors 
with decentralized fiscal policies is the appropriate institutional design that would reduce the inflation 
bias and stabilize better the regional idiosyncratic shocks in a monetary union in the cases of perfectly 
asymmetric and perfectly symmetric shocks. In addition, in the case of asymmetric transmission, the 
monetary union would be better off with a council of monetary policy governors and centralized fiscal 
policies.  
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1. Introduction 
The optimal design of a monetary union among a group of independent countries with 
asymmetries, such as the European Monetary Union (EMU), is not a matter of monetary 
policy-making alone, but fiscal policy-making also play an important role. Critics of the 
current efforts to build a monetary union in Europe recognize that the Maastricht Treaty has 
no provision for a single fiscal policy to complement the single monetary policy and argue 
that the success of the EMU will depend on large part on the appropriate design of the 
monetary and fiscal policy-making. Indeed, since January 1999, national monetary policies of 
the EMU-member countries are completely centralized in the hands of one central monetary 
authority, the European Central Bank (ECB). At the same time, however, national central 
banks continue to exert an important influence on this policy-making process. Thus the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) combines unity of decisions with participation of 
national central banks in the decision making process and in the implementation of these 
decisions. On the o ther hand, national fiscal policies of the EMU-member countries are 
completely decentralized in the hands of the national governments. 
This institutional structure of the EMU reflects late 1980’s conventional wisdom according to 
which monetary policy-making looks after inflation, and governments of EMU-member 
countries fiscal policies look after local cyclical conditions while monitoring their 
indebtedness. The basic point in this argument is that, once exchange rate are irrevocably 
fixed and monetary policy can only be used to stabilize symmetric shocks to all country-
members of  the monetary union, a system of fiscal spending and taxation must be in place to 
equilibrate transitory regional cyclical economic instability. According to this argument, the 
debate over the monetary and fiscal policy-making implications of a monetary union focuses 
mainly on the effects of transitory idiosyncratic shocks, causing asymmetric effects across the 
country-members of the monetary union. On the other hand, shocks with symmetric effects 
across the members of the union would not require exchange rate adjustments, and can be 
dealt with using the union-wide monetary policy. Thus, monetary policy can still be used to 
stabilize aggregate shocks that affect all members, but individual countries cannot use 
monetary policy to respond to idiosyncratic shocks.  
In this respect, the optimal design of monetary and fiscal institutions in a monetary union 
requires the clarification of two issues relative to the conditions under what stabilization 
policy will be effective in a monetary union: first, the optimal monetary and fiscal policy-
making from the point of view of the strategic interaction between the monetary and fiscal 
policy-makers; second, the distribution of the power over monetary and fiscal policies   2
between the center of the union and the individual members. In fact, the architecture of the 
EMU has come about as a compromise between the need to unify the monetary policy-
making process in a monetary union and the desire of national policy-makers to be involved 
in this process. The advantage of the decentralized structure of this system is that it allows for 
a maximum of information regarding the local economic conditions to filter through in the 
decision process. The disadvantage is that too much focus on local conditions can paralyze 
decision-makers when each of them attaches a large weight to economic conditions they 
originate from. 
  The purpose of this paper is to examine the monetary and fiscal policy-making in an 
environment like the EMU. This is characterized by the existence of nation-states with their 
own idiosyncrasies, monetary policy-makers who take decisions jointly but also keep the 
interest of their countries and fiscal policies are completely decentralized in the hands of the 
national governments. From a theoretical point of view, an emerging literature is dealing with 
the optimal design of central banking institutions1. In this literature, Von Hagen and Süppel 
(1994) assume a federal central bank governed by a council consisting of two alternative 
types of appointees (governors or country representatives) which is designed to make his 
decision by a simple majority rule. In this context, the governors desire to stabilize the union’s 
inflation and output, whereas country representatives are concerned with regional economic 
welfare. They conclude that the country representatives solution leads to an inefficient 
monetary stabilization policy. On the other hand, in a recent paper, De Grauwe (2000) study 
the monetary policy-making in monetary union when the monetary authority faces of two type 
of asymmetries : asymmetric shocks and asymmetric transmission2. A general finding is that 
the degree of asymmetries increases, the effectiveness of stabilization of output is reduced. As 
a result, when asymmetries increase, the stabilization effort of the central bank declines for 
given preferences about stabilization. Thus, if the asymmetries (either in chocks or in 
transmission) are high the central bank will be perceived to be conservative, even though it is 
not, in terms of its declared preferences. He also finds that the central bank can improve the 
efficiency of its monetary policies when asymmetries in the transmission exist, by using 
national information in the setting of optimal policies. 
This paper extends the De Grauwe’s (2000)  analysis in several directions. First, it considers 
the link between monetary and fiscal policy-making and examines the interplay between 
                                                            
1 See, among others, von Hagen and Süppel (1994) and Godbillon and Sidiropoulos (2001).   3
monetary and fiscal policies in a two-country monetary union framework. Second,  it 
considers not only the design of the central bank institutions but also the design of fiscal 
authority institutions. Third, the relation between the degree of asymmetries and the 
effectiveness of stabilization is focused on the interaction between monetary fiscal policy, the 
private sector and the (inflation and budget deficit bias), and  thus on the credibility/flexibility 
trade-off. Forth, within this framework, we analyze  the implications of alternative 
institutional arrangements : centralization versus decentralization. 
We assume that the monetary union already exists and that monetary and fiscal policies are 
decided by the union’s monetary and fiscal councils. In addition, the individual countries of 
the union differ in their economic characteristics. Indeed, individual countries are subject to 
different shocks and their representatives will have different preferences over monetary and 
fiscal policies. Therefore, the union’s policy-makers may look at monetary and fiscal policies 
from two different perspectives: a unified one considering union-wide aggregates of output, 
and prices as the relevant policy targets, and a regional or national one taking regional or 
national aggregates as targets. In particular, the purpose of this paper is to examine which of 
the two alternative types of appointment (governors or country representatives) of the fiscal 
council contributes to efficient stabilization policies. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a model of fiscal-monetary game in 
a monetary union. Section 3 presents the issues of the policy game between representative 
monetary authorities and centralized and decentralized fiscal policymakers. Then, section 4 
explains the stabilization power of monetary governor facing alternative fiscal decisions 
making.  Section 5, summarizes the main conclusions. 
 
2. A two-country monetary union framework 
 
Consider an monetary union which consists of two countries. The model under consideration 
is an extended version of the closed-economy framework of Alesina and Tabellini (1987) to a 
two-country setting by allowing for the monetary and fiscal policy interaction  in a monetary 
union. Our model, in contrast of  Alesina and Tabellini (1987), is stochastic rather than 
deterministic3, featuring a c redibility and flexibility (stabilization) trade-off problem, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2 There is a large literature analyzing the importance of asymmetric shocks. See among others, Bayoumi and 
Einchengreen (1993), Artis and Zhang (1995), Melitz and Zumer (1999). On the other hand, some recent 
papers (Dornbusch, et al., 1998) analyze the importance of asymmetric transmission mechanism.     
3 In this respect see, among other, Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999). 
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finally, following De Grauwe (2000), considers two alternative types of asymmetries (shocks 
and transmission mechanism).  
 
2.1. The monetary union economy 
As in Alesina and Tabellini (1987), output which is taxed at a rate  t , is produced by 
competitive firms which use labor input as the sole variable input in the production process. 
Thus, output in both countries is given by the following supply functions :  
 
        ) (               t t
e
t t t y y e t p p a + - - + =      0 > a          (1a) 
* * * * * * * + - - + = t t
e
t t t y y e t p p a       ) (           
      0 >
* a         (1b) 
 
where  y  is the log of real output,  y  is the equilibrium (natural) level  of output,4  p  and 
e p  
denote, respectively, the actual and expected rate of inflation, t  is the tax rate on output and 
e  is an aggregate supply shock, distributed normally with zero mean and variance 
2
e s . The 
superscript  ‘e’ denotes the rational expectation based on information available at the end of 
the previous period. Variables without asterisk and with asterisk  indicate countries 1 and 2 
respectively. Asymmetries appear in two forms in this model. One is an asymmetry in the 
transmission mechanism represented by different values for a  and 
* a  (i.e. the slopes of the 
short-term supply functions).  The other asymmetry is an asymmetry in the national stochastic 
disturbances, represented by different values for e  and 
* e . From equations (1a) and (1b), it 
follows one source of unemployment : high tax rates drive down output and increase 
unemployment in the two countries.   
  The representation of the demand side in both countries is deliberately kept simple in 
this model, consisting only of a quantity equation linking the central bank’s policy instrument, 
the money growth rate, to the rate of inflation. The link between the money growth rate , m,  
and the output price inflation rate in the two countries is given respectively by :  t t m p =  and 
* * = t t m p . Thus, we assume that the monetary authorities directly set the rate of inflation. In an 
alternative and complicated version of the model one could introduce an equation linking the 
inflation rate to another instrument of  monetary policy (e.g. the short-term interest rate). 
Finally, it is assumed that the inflation rate is assumed equal in the two countries, i.e. 
* = t t p p . 
                                                            
4    For convenience and without loss of generality, the natural level of output  y  (
* y ) is normalized to zero.   5
In other words, the common monetary authority sets a common monetary policy (or a 
common inflation rate) that will prevail in the whole union.  
  The government budget constraints faced by the two countries fiscal authorities are as 
follows: 
            t t t g p t    + =                 (2a) 
            
* * * + = t t t g p t                 (2b)  
These approximations to the government budget constraints follow Alesina and Tabellini 
(1987), by abstracting from the intertemporal dimension of the government budget constraint 
through the assumption that government expenditures are not financed by issuance of public 
debt.5  The absence of the public debt can be interpreted as a situation in which the fiscal 
authorities wish to raise the desired amount of government expenditure in the form of taxes or 
seigniorage revenues. Government expenditures are determined once tax rates and money 
seigniorage have been chosen. Unlike Alesina and Tabellini, there is a common money 
seigniorage for the two countries, which is determined by the overall inflation rate set by the 
single central bank.  
 
2.2. The policy environment   
We assume that the countries are the individual agents whose welfare is maximized. The 
monetary policy decision process, however, is unified. One way this idea can be formalized is 
by specifying that the common monetary authority set the common inflation rate of so as to 
minimize the following loss function :  
 
* - + = M M M V V V ) 1 (  
~
min g g
p ,       1 0 £ £ g       (3) 
where  M V  and 
*
M V   are the loss functions of central banks of the two member-countries of the 
monetary union. The parameter g  can be interpreted as the weight given to country 1 in the 
decision process. The parameter  g  may or not be chosen proportional to the size or the 
population of country 1 relative to country 2, so that more weight is attached to the loss 
                                                            
5 The nominal government budget constraint can be written :  t t t t t t t t t t t B P M M T P B P r G P + - + = + + - - ) ( ) 1 ( 1 1 , 
where  t G  is the public expenditure,  t t t Y T t =   the taxes,  t M  is the money supply,  t B  the public debt,  t P  the 
price level, t Y  the output level,  1 - t B the debt issued in period  1 - t  and to be paid in  t. Assuming  
0 1 = = - t t B B  and  dividing both sides by nominal income, t tY P , we obtain :  t t t t t t Y P M M g ) ( 1 - - + =t , 
where  t t t t Y P G g / = .  Finally, using a simplified quantity equation,  t t t t Y P V M ) / 1 ( = with 1 = t V , we can 
obtain equation (2), where  t t t t M M M m ) ( 1 - - =  and  t t m = p .   6
function of the country having a larger population.6  The national monetary authorities seek to 
minimize in their countries the deviation of inflation rate from a goal zero, departures of 
output from non tax distorted output, and deviations of public expenditure from the target 
government spending : 
 
    ( )( )
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                                   ( )( )
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where    0 ,   > f m and   0 ,   >
* * f m , g denotes the ratio of public expenditures over output,  y and 
g  represent respectively output and public expenditures targets of country representatives. 
Monetary and fiscal policy-makers are assumed to have the same ultimate targets, and the 
same relative weights attributed to output and public expenditure relative to inflation (m  and 
f ), reflecting their different incentives and constraints. The loss weights on output and public 
spending deviations from target are assumed to depend on the relative size of the countries in 
terms of their population or output.  Both authorities wish to minimize the deviations of 
inflation and output from a target value, which is normalized to zero for simplicity. In 
addition, they wish to minimize the deviations of public expenditures from a non-negative 
target g  respectively.7  
In a similar way, the fiscal authorities in both countries choose the tax rates in their 
respective countries to minimize the following loss functions : 
 
      ( )( )
2 2 2 )   (     ) (         1/2     min g g y y V t t t F - + - + = f m p
t                                  (5a) 
                         ( )( )
2 2 2 )   (     ) (         1/2   min g g y y V t t t F - + - + =
* * *
* f m p
t
                             (5b) 
Government expenditures are determined residually from the government budget constraints, 
defined in equation (2). Because the fiscal authorities are subject to electoral discipline, we 
assume in the remainder of the analysis that the preferences of the fiscal authorities in 
equation (5) also reflect the underlying social preferences.  
                                                            
6 It will be remembered that in the ESCB one country has one vote irrespective of the size. However, because 
the members of the ECB-Board also have a nationality so that some countries have two votes. It is then 
assumed that the members of the ECB Board vote national. 
7 If  0 > y  and  0 > g , the outcome is the existence of  two bias : an inflation bias and a budget deficit bias. 
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  The federal structure of the monetary union raises the question of how to distribute the 
power over monetary and fiscal policy between the center and the two countries of the union. 
The decision process in this monetary union is now assumed to be organized according to the 
four alternative institutional arrangements considered below : 8  
(i)  First, we begin with a monetary union in which monetary policy-makers take decisions   
jointly in a common monetary authority where the members are country representatives  
keeping the interest of their countries and national fiscal policies are uncoordinated and 
completely decentralized in the hands of the national governments. 
(ii)  Second, we extend this analysis by introducing  fiscal policy-makers who take decisions 
jointly in a common fiscal authority where the members are country  representatives 
minimizing the following common loss function .   
(iii) Third, we assume a monetary union in which the members of the common monetary 
authority are governors keeping the interest of the whole union and the fiscal policy-
making is uncoordinated  and decentralized in the hands of the national governments. 
(iv) Fourth, we extend this analysis by introducing  fiscal policy-makers who take decisions 
jointly in a common fiscal authority where the members are country representatives.  
In the remaining sections, we analyze and we compare the optimal inflation and output 
stabilization policy-making under the previous alternative institutional arrangements by 
focusing, first, on the asymmetry of the national shocks (in other words, we assume that both 
countries in the monetary union experience the same transmission mechanism, i.e.
* =a a , but 
exhibit asymmetric national shocks, i.e.
* „ e e ), and then, on asymmetry on transmission 
process (different slope of Phillips curve, i.e. 
* „a a  and 
* = e e ).  
 
3. A monetary union with a monetary authority of country representatives  
  
In this section, we consider a monetary union in which the monetary policy decision 
process is assumed to be organized by a common (union-wide)  monetary authority 
composed entirely by country representatives (indicated by MR). We assume one monetary 
representative for each country. All union members have one vote and a proposal may be 
accepted according to a majority rule of votes. One way this idea can be formalized is the 
following. Each country representative (or national central bank) computes its loss, 
                                                            
8   Following von Hagen and Süppel (1994), we distinguish two types of appointees : the country representatives   
and the governors. The term ‘governors’ is borrowed from the U.S federal system practice.  
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represented respectively by equations 4a and 4b, given the asymmetric shock it observes in 
its domestic supply function (i.e. equations 1a and 1b). This loss is then aggregate using 
equation (3) and by giving the suitable weights.9  The common monetary authority then 
computes the first order condition of this aggregate loss function, which determines the 
optimal inflation rate that will be applied to the whole monetary union. To complete this 
institutional setting, we consider two alternative scenarios of fiscal policy making by 
assuming alternatively that national fiscal authorities coordinate or not their fiscal policies 
in the presence of the common monetary authority. 
 
3.1. Decentralized  fiscal policies 
 
In this initial setting, the fiscal authority of each country-member of the monetary union is 
assumed not to coordinate with either the common monetary authority or the fiscal 
authority of the other country. Thus the two national fiscal authorities choose the tax rates 
in their own countries to minimize their loss functions represented respectively in 
equations (5a) and (5b). 
 
3.1.1 Asymmetry in shocks  
 
We consider here a monetary union where both countries experience the same transmission 
mechanism (
* =a a ), but exhibit asymmetric national shocks (
* „ e e ). In this institutional 
setting, the time-consistent ex post optimal solutions under monetary and fiscal discretion 
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9 In the following, we will generally set  5 . 0 = g  assuming that both countries have the same weight in the  
decision process.  
10  Time indices have been omitted for notational convenience. 





































) )( ( ) )( (
2














yMR     (8b) 
where   




1 > = > + + = mfa f f ma B A  
  ( ) 0 ) 6 5 1 ( ) 3 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( ) / (
2 4 2 2 2 2
1 1 > + + + + + + + = f f a m f f fma f f ma A C , 
   ( ) 0 ) 4 4 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 ) / (
2 4 2 2
1 1 > + + + + + = f f a m f mfa f m A D . 
 
Inspection of equation (6) reveals that the aggregate  supply shocks (
* +e e ) are only partially 
offset by the optimal (discretionary) setting of the country representatives monetary policy. 
The optimal fiscal policy solution (7a,b) shows that the higher is the supply shocks, the higher 
is the need to use distortionary taxation to finance public expenditures. Moreover, the 
solutions show that the higher is the public expenditure target  g , the higher is the need to use 
distortionary taxation to finance public spending and the higher is the inflation rate in the 
monetary union. If  0 = f , that is, if public expenditures does not enter in the authorities loss 
function, then inflation rate is at his targeted level ( 0 = MR p ). Moreover, in the case where 
output does not enter in the authorities loss functions ( 0 = m ), then it is straightforward to 
show that there is no incentive of monetary authorities to create unexpected inflation. Thus 
inflation rate is zero.  In other words, there is perfect credibility of the monetary authorities 
because of their independence (in objective) relative to the political business cycles. 
 This first analysis reveals that the problem of the optimal monetary and fiscal policy 
choice in this monetary union is the trading off between the credibility constraint required for 
eliminating the inflation bias and the flexibility needed for stabilization of the shocks.11 The 
question then becomes: Can we design an appropriate institutional arrangement in this 
monetary union that would overcome this problem? To this question we now turn. More 
precisely, we turn now to the question of how much stabilization of output there will be when 
asymmetric shocks occur. In order to do so, we compute the variance of the expressions (6), 
(8a) and (8 b) : 12 
                                                            
11  In this respect, see Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999). 
12 These results are obtained under the  assumption that  
2 2
* = e e s s . A possible justification of this assumption is 
that the two countries in the monetary union are assumed of equal size.  From the solution (6),   10
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where  r  denotes the correlation coefficient of the national idiosyncratic shocks  e  and 
* e . 
Two extreme cases can be distinguished : the case of perfect asymmetry i n the national 
shocks (i.e. 1 - = r ), and the case of  perfect symmetry in the national shocks (i.e. 1 = r ).  
Consider first the case of perfect asymmetry in national shocks ( 1 - = r ). Using 
equations (9) and (10), we obtain respectively the following inflation and output  variability :  
 
0 Var  = MR p    and   
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These results reveal that the common monetary authority of country representatives does not 
adjust the optimal inflation rate to the perfectly asymmetric shocks that occur in the two 
countries of the monetary union. On the other hand, since this common monetary authority do 
not adjust inflation rate so as to accommodate for national asymmetric shocks, the variability 
of output in both countries is positive. The intuition behind this result is that with perfect 
asymmetry in national shocks, the national desires about the optimal monetary policy exactly 
offset each other. Consequently, there is a stalemate in the decision process of the common 
monetary authority and nothing is done to stabilize output. In the case where output does not 
enter in the authorities loss functions (i.e. 0 = m ), then it is straightforward to show that the 
common monetary authority of country representatives behaves as if it is a super-conservative 
central bank because the variability of output is exactly equal to the variability of the 
underlying shocks :
2 ) ( Var ) ( Var e s = =
* y y . Our results reveal that the output variability is 
lower than the variability of the underlying shocks because national fiscal authorities stabilize 
partially these local shocks. 
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equations (9) and (10).  In this respect, see De Grauwe (2000).  
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On the other extreme case, where national shocks are perfectly symmetric ( 1 = r ), we 
can find the following results :  
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The positive variability of inflation rate in equation (12a) means that the common monetary 
authority of country representatives adjusts the optimal inflation rate to the symmetric shocks 
that occur in the two countries of the monetary union. Since the common monetary authority 
adjusts the inflation rate so as to accommodate for shocks, equation (12b) shows that the 
variability of output becomes positive in the presence of perfect symmetric shocks. 
Comparison of equations (11) and (12b), reveals that variability of output is greater in the last 
case than in the case of perfect asymmetric shocks.  More generally, we find that the degree of 
inflation variability and the degree of output stabilization exerted by the monetary and fiscal  
authorities in this monetary union are positive functions of the correlation of the shocks : 
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Consequently, even if the monetary policy country representatives preferences (as given by  m  
and  f ) do not change, an increase in  r  increases their output stabilization (or flexibility) 
effort and induces them to increase the variability of inflation reducing their credibility effort.  
Conversely, a decline in  r  leads them to reduce their stabilization efforts and to increase the 
credibility of their common monetary policy.  
 
3.1.2. Asymmetry in transmission  
 
We focus now on the asymmetry of the transmission mechanism. We will assume that both 
countries in the monetary union experience symmetric national shocks (
* = e e ), but exhibit 
asymmetry of the transmission mechanism (i.e.
* „a a ). Under this assumption, we compute 
the variance of the inflation rate and the variances of the output in both countries as : 
   12
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where   ) )( 2 / 1 ( ~ * + = a a a  and  ( )
2 2 2 ) ~ ( ) ~ ( ) 2 / 1 ( a a a a s a - + - =
* . We define a ~  as the average 
of the union-wide estimate of the slope of the supply function and we can interpret this 
variance 
2
a s  as a measure of the asymmetry in the transmission process.13 Equation (13a) 
shows that, with an increasing asymmetry in the transmission mechanism (increasing 
2
a s ), 
the less the common monetary authority adjusts the inflation rate to stabilize the economy.  In 
this respect, monetary policies decided by country representatives  and aimed to stabilize 
output become less effective. Assuming that  a a >
*  (i.e. more flexibility in the labor market 
of country 2 than in the labor market of country 1), the numerator of (13b) is greater than the 
numerator of (13c) and the variance of output is greater in the rigid country than in the 
flexible country. Indeed, when a symmetric shock hits symmetrically both countries of the 
monetary union, the stabilizing effect of the monetary and fiscal policy mix will be stronger in 
flexible country  than in the rigid country, since output in the flexible country reacts stronger 
to prices than in the rigid country.  Finally, we find that an increase in the asymmetry of the 
transmission process (measured by 
2
a s ) increases the variance in the rigid country and 
reduces it in the flexible country.14 
      
3.2. Centralized fiscal policies 
 
We now assume that the two national fiscal authorities coordinate their fiscal policies in the 
presence of the common monetary authority. In this respect, the control over taxation and 
government spending will be assumed centralized at the federal union level rather than at a 
                                                            
13  A justification of this assumption may be founded on the Lucas critique  which states that policy changes 
affect the parameters of the reduced-form models. 
 
14  In the appendix 1 we provide the demonstration of this result.   13
national  level.  In an admittedly simplified manner, this case can be analysed by introducing 
a federal fiscal authority which might be looked upon as a coalition of the national fiscal 
authorities designing a common fiscal policy.15   One way this idea can be formalized is by 
assuming, in a similar way to the case of the common monetary authority, that the federal 
fiscal authority seeks to minimize the following loss function : 
 
* - + = F F F V V V ) 1 (  
~
min ~ g g
t
  ,   1 0 £ £ g                      (14) 
 
where  F V  and 
*
F V   are the loss functions of the fiscal authorities of the two member-countries 
of the monetary union. This is different from the insular fiscal policy in which the fiscal 
authorities chose the tax rates in their own countries to minimize their own loss function. It is 
assumed here that the federal fiscal authority chose a common output tax rate,  t ~ . The 
common monetary authority again chooses the union inflation to minimize its loss function.  
 
3.2.1 Asymmetry in shocks (
* „ e e and 
* =a a ) 
 
We consider then the scenario in which both monetary and fiscal policies in the monetary 
union is decided by two common monetary and fiscal authorities composed respectively by 
monetary and fiscal country representatives (indicated by MFR) in the presence of asymmetric 
shocks. The time-consistent solutions under monetary and fiscal discretion in the presence of 
a common monetary authority and coordinating fiscal authorities give us respectively the 
following  variances of the inflation rate and the output :   
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where     1 1 1 f + + = B A K and    1 1 2 f - + = B A K . Taking into account equations (15a) and 
(15b) and the  assumption of perfectly asymmetric national shocks ( 1 - = r ), we obtain : 
                                                            
15 In this perspective, it might be similar to the current ECOFIN in which the ministers of finance and economic 
affairs of the EU countries regularly meet to coordinate fiscal and economic policies. As in the case of the 
ECB, the ultimate policies of the federal fiscal authority are likely to involve an intricate bargaining process 
between the EU countries.   
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           0 Var  = MFR p   and   
2 Var  Var  e s = =
*
MFR MFR y y       (16) 
On the other hand, when there is perfect symmetry in the national shocks ( 1 = r ), we can 
establish the following results : 
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MFR MFR y y         (17b) 
The first result in equation (16) means that the monetary authority of country representatives 
does not adjust the optimal inflation rate to the perfectly asymmetric shocks that occur in the 
two countries of the monetary union. The second result in equation (16) reveals that there is 
no stabilization at all, because the variability of output is exactly equal to the variability of the 
underlying shocks.  The intuition behind these results is that with perfect asymmetry, the 
national desires of the two country representatives about the optimal monetary and fiscal 
policies exactly offset each other. Therefore, there is a stalemate in the decision process of 
both monetary and fiscal councils of country representatives and nothing is done. 
Consequently, the common monetary and fiscal councils of country representatives behave as 
two super-conservative authorities which set the weights on output and government spending 
stabilization equal to zero (i.e. 0 = =f m ). Equations (17a) and (17b) provide the same results 
as those obtained in the previous case, equations (12a) and (12b). Therefore, these two 
institutional arrangements have the same stabilizing features.  
 
3.2.2. Asymmetry in transmission (
* = e e  and 
* „a a ) 
 
We focus now on the asymmetry of the transmission mechanism. Under this assumption, we 
obtain the following variances of the inflation and the output in both countries : 
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These equations reveal that  with increasing asymmetry in the transmission, monetary and 
fiscal authorities are less effective in stabilizing output. As a result, they apply less 
stabilization effort and thus, inflation will be less variable.          
 
4. A monetary union with a monetary authority of union-wide governors  
 
 
In this section, we examine an alternative institutional arrangement for the monetary policy 
authority in a monetary union : members of the monetary authority are union-wide governors. 
Indeed, following von Hagen and Süppel (1994), we can distinguish in a monetary union two 
types of appointees : the governors and the country  representatives. The members of the 
council of monetary governors are chosen through a centralized appointment procedure and 
are assumed to look at optimal monetary policy from a unified perspective considering union-
wide aggregates as the relevant policy targets. This also implies that they disregard the 
national information about inflation and output. In this respect, monetary governors 
preferences depend on the union-wide inflation and output targets and they minimize the 
following loss function : 
( )( )
2 2 ~           1/2    
~
min y VM x p
p + = ,      0 ‡ x                                     (19) 
                                         
where  M V
~   is the loss of the common monetary authority, p  is the aggregate union inflation 
rate, and   y ~ is the aggregate union output level defined as : 
* - + = y y y ) 1 (   ~ g g .16  The logic 
of taking a union-wide perspective is that the national supply functions are aggregate into one 
union supply function as :  e t p p a ~       ) ~ ( ~       ~ + - - =
e y ,  where a ~  is an estimate of the union-
wide slope of the short-term supply function, and e ~ is the common union-wide shock in the 
supply function. We will set   
* - + = a g ga a ) 1 ( ~  and  
* - + = e g ge e ) 1 ( ~  with   1 0 £ £ g . 
 
4.1. Decentralized  fiscal policies 
 
 
In the initial setting, we consider a discretionary common  monetary authority composed 
entirely by governors (indicated by  MG). The fiscal authorities of  both countries of the 
                                                            
16 This contrasts with the optimising procedure we have followed in previous sections, where we assume that the 
national authorities (representatives) aggregate their national loss functions (using national data) through 
some common decision making process.    16
monetary union are assumed not to coordinate their policies with either the common monetary 
authority of governors or the fiscal authority of the other country.  
 
4.1.1. Asymmetry in shocks  
 
We consider again a monetary union where both countries experience the same transmission 
mechanism (i.e.
* =a a ), but exhibit asymmetric national shocks (i.e.
* „ e e ). In this setting, 
the time-consistent ex post optimal solutions under monetary and fiscal discretion for 
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Using these time-consistent optimal solutions for inflation and output, we then examine the 
question of how much stabilization of monetary union there will be when asymmetric shocks 
occur. Thus, we compute  the variances of the inflation rate and output in both countries and 
then we analyze the two extreme cases : perfect asymmetry in the shocks ( 1 - = r ), and the 
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MG MG y y          (23b) 
                                                            
17 We set here  5 . 0 = g  assuming that both countries have the same weight in the  decision process.    17
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MG MG y y         (24b) 
 
We can consider here the case of an independent monetary council stabilizing the union-wide 
inflation rate reflected by the assumption that output does not enter i nto the monetary 
governors’ objective function (that is,  0 = x ). From these solutions it is straightforward to 
establish the following results :  0 Var  = MG p ,  0 Var     and    0 Var  > >
*
MG MG y y  . According to 
these results, there is a perfect credibility of the independent governors’ monetary policy.  
These results reveal that an independent common monetary authority of governors does not 
adjust the optimal inflation rate to the perfectly asymmetric and symmetric shocks that occur 
in the two countries of the monetary union. Since the monetary authority of governors do not 
adjust inflation so as to accommodate for national shocks, the variability of output in both 
countries is positive.                   
 
  4.1.2. Asymmetry in transmission  
 
Under the assumption of the asymmetry in the transmission mechanism (
* „a a ) and the 
symmetry of shocks (
* = e e ), we obtain in this institutional policy design the following 
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where  
* - = a af mf
2
2 3 C ,  ) ( 4
2
2
* * + + = ama f ama m D  and 
2
1 2 ) 2 ( 2 xf axa mf + + =
* F . If 
we consider again an independent common monetary authority of governors stabilizing the 
union-wide inflation rate (reflected by the assumption  0 = x ), it is straightforward to establish 
the following results :  0 Var    = ¢ MG p , 0 Var     and     0 Var      > > ¢
*
¢ MG MG y y  . In other words, 
equation (25a) shows that, with an increasing asymmetry in the transmission mechanism 
(increasing 
2
a s ), an independent common monetary authority of governors does not adjusts 
the optimal inflation rate to shocks in order to stabilize output in the two countries. On the 
other hand, equations (25b) and (25c) reveal that  with an increasing asymmetry in the 
transmission mechanism, monetary and fiscal policies are less effective in stabilizing output.  
 
4.2. Centralized fiscal policies 
 
 
We consider now the case where the two national fiscal authorities coordinate their fiscal 
policies by creating a federal council of country representatives in the presence of the 
common monetary authority of governors (designed by  MGFR). One way this idea can be 
formalized is by assuming, as previously, that the federal fiscal authority of country 
representatives seeks to minimize the loss function represented by equation (14) and the 
monetary governors preferences are presented by equation (19).  
 
4.2.1. Asymmetry in shocks (
* „ e e and 
* =a a ) 
 
In an initial setting, we assume that both countries experience asymmetric national shocks in 
the presence of  the same transmission mechanism. Moreover, w e assume that the two 
countries may have different weights in the decision process (i.e. 5 . 0 „ g ). Under these 
assumptions, we obtain the following variances of the union-wide inflation rate and of the 
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When there is perfect symmetry in the national shocks (i.e. 1 = r ), we obtain :  
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MGFR MGFR y y                (27b) 
 
If we consider an independent common monetary authority of governors stabilizing the union-
wide inflation rate (reflected by the assumption  0 = x ) in the presence of a federal fiscal 
council of country representatives, it is straightforward to establish in the two alternative 
cases (perfectly asymmetric shocks, and perfectly symmetric shocks) the following results : 
0 Var    = MGFR p ,
2
  Var    Var  e s = =
*
MGFR MGFR y y . The same results are obtained also in the case 
of perfect asymmetric shocks if we assume that both countries have the same weight in the  
decision process (i.e. 5 . 0 = g ). This means that the monetary union authorities do not adjust 
the inflation rate so as to accommodate for national shocks and thus variability of output is 
exactly equal to the variability of the underlying shocks.  
 
4.2.2. Asymmetry in transmission (
* = e e  and 
* „a a ) 
 
Finally, under the assumptions of asymmetry in the transmission mechanism and the 
symmetry in shocks, we can obtain the following variances of the union-wide inflation rate 
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These results show that, with an increasing asymmetry in the transmission mechanism, an 
independent monetary authority of governors (i.e.) does not adjust the inflation rate so as to 
accommodate for national shocks. That is, if  0 = x , it is straightforward to establish the 
following results :   0 Var    = ¢ MGFR p ,  0 Var     and     0 Var      > > ¢
*
¢ MGFR MGFR y y   Assuming that 
a a >
*  the variance of output is greater in the rigid country than in the flexible country, so 
that,      Var    Var  ¢
*
¢ > MGFR MGFR y y . For example, when a symmetric shock hits symmetrically 
both countries, the stabilizing effect of the monetary and fiscal policy mix will be stronger in 
flexible country  than in the rigid country, since output in the flexible country reacts stronger 
to prices than in the rigid country.   
 
 
5. Comparison of the alternative institutional policy-mix arrangements  
 
 
The question arising here is which is the appropriate institutional policy design that would 
better resolve the trade-off between the inflation bias (credibility) and the output stabilization 
(flexibility) in a monetary union. To investigate the appropriate policy design (or the optimal 
policy mix), we evaluate and compare the performances of the four previous alternative 
institutional arrangements : monetary country representatives or monetary union-wide 
governors with and without coordinating fiscal authorities. In this respect, we focus our 
analysis on the variability of inflation and output in the following special cases: perfectly 
asymmetric shocks,  perfectly symmetric shocks, and asymmetric transmission .   
 
5.1. Perfectly asymmetric shocks  
 
Consider first the case in which individual countries are affected by perfectly asymmetric 
shocks. Comparing first the performances of an institutional design in a monetary union 
constituting by a monetary authority of country representatives in the  presence of a 
decentralized fiscal policies (designed by MR) with the performances of an institutional design 
constituting by a monetary authority of country representatives in the presence of centralized 
fiscal policies (designed by MFR), we obtain the following results :  0 Var  Var  = = MFR MR p p , 
MFR MR y y Var     Var  <  and 
* * < MFR MR y y Var     Var   . Comparing next the performances of an 
institutional design constituting by a monetary authority of union-wide governors in the 
presence of a decentralized fiscal policies  (designed by  MG) with the performances of an 
institutional design constituting by a monetary authority of union-wide governors in the   21
presence of a centralized fiscal policies (designed by MGFR), we obtain the following results: 
0 Var  Var  = = MGFR MG p p ,  MGFR MG y y Var  Var  <  , 
* * < MGFR MG y y Var  Var  . Finally, following 
these results a comparison of  inflation and output variances among the four previous 
institutional arrangements (MR, MG, MFR and MGFR) may be summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 : Comparison of solutions under perfectly asymmetric shocks( 1 - = r ) 
 
Union-wide inflation  
 
Output in country 1 
 
Output in country 2 
 
0 Var  Var  = = MG MR p p  
 
 
2 Var  Var  e s < < MR MG y y  
 
2 Var  Var  e s > <
* *
MR MG y y  
 
0 Var  Var  = = MGFR MFR p p  
 
2 Var  Var  e s = = MGFR MFR y y  
 
2 Var  Var  e s = =
* *




The comparison of the results of the four cases indicates that the institutional arrangement 
where a common monetary authority constituting by union-wide governors exist in the 
presence of decentralized national fiscal policies (MG) is the appropriate institutional design in 
the case of perfectly asymmetric shocks.  This institutional design reduce the inflation bias 
and his variance ( 0 Var  = MG p ) and better stabilize the output in the case of asymmetric 
shocks (
2 Var  Var  e s < < MR MG y y ). Noting that these results are obtained under the 
assumption of the independence of the monetary council of union-wide governors (i.e. 0 = x ), 
and under the following assumption :  1 ) /( ) (
2 2 2 < + ma f ma .  18 Consequently, with this 
institutional design we obtain the best trade-off between credibility and flexibility in a 
monetary union. 
     
5.2. Perfectly symmetric shocks  
 
Consider now the case in which monetary union countries are affected by perfectly symmetric 
shocks. A summary of the comparisons among the different institutional regimes is illustrated 
                                                            
18 When we set  1 = a , this last condition may be transformed as : 1 > m . This means that the relative weight 
attributed to the output stabilization is significantly high in the loss functions of the local fiscal authorities.   22
in Table 2 . These results are provided under the assumption of independence of the monetary 
authority of union-wide governors (i.e. 0 = x ). 
 
Table 2 : Comparison of solutions under perfectly symmetric shocks( 1 = r ) 
 
Union-wide inflation  
 
Output in country 1 
 
Output in country 2 
 
0 Var  Var  > = MFR MR p p  
 
 
0 Var  Var  > = MFR MR y y  
and MG MFR y y Var  Var  <  
 
0 Var  Var  > =
* *
MFR MR y y  
and  MG MFR y y   Var Var 
* * <  
 
0 Var Var = = MGFR MG p p  
2 Var  Var  e s = < MGFR MG y y  
2 Var  Var  e s = < MGFR MFR y y  
2 Var  Var  e s = <
* *
MGFR MG y y  
2 Var  Var  e s = <
* *
MGFR MFR y y
 
 
In the first line, we report the results of the comparison between the performances of an 
institutional regime constituting by a monetary authority of country representatives with a 
decentralized fiscal policies (MR) and the performances of an institutional regime constituting 
by a monetary authority of country representatives with a centralized fiscal policies (MFR).  In 
the second line, we report the results of the comparison between an institutional regime 
constituting by a monetary authority of union-wide governors with a decentralized fiscal 
policies ( MG) and the performances of an institutional design constituting by a monetary 
authority of union-wide governors with a centralized fiscal policies (MGFR). The comparison 
of these results indicates that, in the case of perfectly symmetric shocks in a monetary union, 
the regime where a common monetary authority constituting by union-wide governors exist in 
the presence of decentralized national fiscal policies ( MG) is the appropriate institutional 
design. This institutional regime reduce the inflation bias and his variance ( 0 Var  = MG p ) and 
better stabilize the output in the case of symmetric shocks (
2 Var  Var  e s = < MGFR MG y y ). 
Consequently, with this institutional design we obtain the best trade-off between credibility 
and flexibility in a monetary union.     
 
5.3. Asymmetric transmission 
Consider finally the case in which monetary union countries are affected by an asymmetric 
transmission mechanism . A summary of the comparisons among the different institutional   23
regimes is illustrated in Table 3 .  These results are provided under the assumption of 
independence of the monetary authority of union-wide governors (i.e. 0 = x ). 
 
   Table 3 : Comparison of solutions under asymmetric transmission ( a a >
* ) 
 
Union-wide inflation  
 
Output in country 1 
 
Output in country 2 
0 Var    > ¢ MR p
0 Var    > ¢ MFR p  
    Var  Var  ¢ ¢ < MFR MR p p  
If   1   and    0 £ = f m : 
    Var  Var  ¢ ¢ £ MFR MR y y  
If  0 = f :     Var  Var  ¢ ¢ £ MFR MR y y  
If   1   and    0 £ = f m : 
    Var Var ¢
*
¢
* £ MFR MR y y  
If  0 = f :     Var Var ¢
*
¢
* £ MFR MR y y  
0 Var    = ¢ MG p  
0 Var    = ¢ MGFR p  
  0 Var    > ¢ MG y  
    0 Var    > ¢ MGFR y  
    Var  Var  ¢ ¢ > MGFR MG y y  
0 Var    > ¢
*
MG y  
0 Var      > ¢
*
MGFR y  
    Var  Var  ¢
*
¢
* > MGFR MG y y  
 
These results reveal that the institutional policy regime of a monetary council of union-wide 
governors with centralized national fiscal policies ( MGFR) is the appropriate institutional 
design in the case of asymmetric transmission process.  This institutional regime reduce the 
inflation bias and his variance ( 0 Var    = ¢ MGFR p ) and better stabilize the output 
(     Var  Var  ¢ ¢ < MR MGFR y y ). These results are obtained under the assumption  of the 
independence of the  monetary council of governors ( 0 = x ), and under the following 
assumption concerning the width of the transmission asymmetry : 
* * - ‡ - ma f ma a a / ) (
2 .    24
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper explores the policy performances of alternative institutional regimes through 
which fiscal policy interact with monetary policy in a monetary union, such as the EMU. 
Indeed, the federal structure of a monetary union raises the question of how to distribute the 
power over monetary and fiscal policies between the center and the member countries of the 
union. The central issue of the paper is the design of the appropriate monetary and fiscal 
institutions by comparing alternative arrangements to distribute this power and evaluating 
their performances.  In this respect,  we investigate which of the two alternative types of 
appointment (country representatives or governors) of the union-wide monetary and fiscal 
authorities contributes to reduce the inflation (credibility) and increase the output stabilization 
effort of authorities (flexibility).  
The optimal design of monetary and fiscal institutions depends on the preferences of the 
member countries , on the stochastic shocks hitting the countries of the union and their 
respective slopes of the supply functions representing the asymmetry in the transmission 
mechanism. We focus our analysis on the variability of inflation and output in the following 
special cases: perfectly asymmetric shocks,  perfectly symmetric shocks, and asymmetric 
transmission. The results of this paper reveal that delegate the monetary policy to a council of 
union-wide governors with decentralized fiscal national policies is the appropriate 
institutional design that would reduce the inflation bias and stabilize better the regional 
idiosyncratic chocks in a monetary union in the cases of perfectly asymmetric and perfectly 
symmetric shocks. In addition, in the case of asymmetric transmission mechanism, the 
monetary union would be better off with a council of monetary policy governors and 
centralized fiscal policies because with this institutional design we obtain the best trade-off 
between credibility and flexibility in a monetary union.  
In general, this paper reviewing the policy-mix problem in a monetary union, offers some 
analytical aspects relative to the EMU’s new situation. Indeed, the institutional policy-mix 
designed by an independent ECB combined with decentralized fiscal policies in the European 
Monetary union seems to be the appropriate institutional solution.  
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Appendix 1 : Derivation of the effect of the variations of a  on the variance of output 
  
Using equation (28a) and the definitions of the union-wide slope of the supply function 
) )( 2 / 1 ( ~ * + = a a a  and the variance  ( )
2 2 2 ) ~ ( ) ~ ( ) 2 / 1 ( a a a a s a - + - =
*  reported in our text, 
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